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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyze the demographic and economic consequences of 
endogenous migrations flows over the coming decades in a multi-regions 
overlapping generations general equilibrium model (INGENUE 2) in which the 
world is divided in ten regions. Our analysis offers a global perspective on the 
consequences of international migration flows. The value-added of the 
INGENUE 2 model is that it enables us to analyze the effects of international 
migration on both the destination and the origin regions. A further innovation of 
our analysis is that international migration is treated as endogenous.  
 
In a first step, we estimate the determinants of migration in an econometric 
model. We show, in particular, that the income differential is one of the key 
variables explaining migration flows. In a second step, we endogenize migration 
flows in the INGENUE 2 model. In order to do so, we use the econometrically 
estimated relationships between demographic and income developments in the 
INGENUE model, which enables us to project long-run migration flows and to 
improve on projections of purely demographic models.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
In the XXIst century, the world economy is facing three major challenges. First, 
the demographic transition and the associated population ageing are putting the 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems of OECD countries under pressure and 
are leading to various reforms. Second, the world economy is becoming 
increasingly interdependent. The deepening of the globalization process is 
reflected in increased levels of international trade, financial integration and 
international labour mobility. Third, the deepening globalization process may 
lead to changes in the world income distribution and, in particular, to an 
increase in North-South income inequalities. In the context of these 3 
phenomena, we use an applied international general equilibrium model to study 
the long-term macroeconomic and demographic prospects of the world 
economy when international migration flows and economic developments are 
mutually interdependent. Along with international capital flows, international 
migration is a key feature in the process of income convergence between 
countries. At the same time, economic factors play an important role in 
migration choices since workers move mainly for higher incomes, better job 
opportunities and a better quality of life. Future trends in migration may have 
substantial demographic consequences. Firstly, as fertility is now below 
replacement in most OECD countries, policies to encourage immigration may 
become an important means for ageing countries to moderate the increase of the 
dependency ratio and the contribution rate. Secondly, workers in countries with 
a growing labor force have an incentive to move to ageing countries if the pace 
of GDP growth does not keep up with population growth. The difference in  
 
 
demographic change between their home countries and their potential host
countries implies a decreasing return to labour in the former and an increas-
ing return to labour and thus increasing income opportunities in the latter.
Consequently, migration ﬂows are driven by several political, demographic
and economic factors, that need to be carefully evaluated to assess migration
potential at the world level
In order to analyze these questions of ageing, migration and inter-regional in-
equalities, we use the Ingenue2 model1. The model describes a multi-region,
world model in the spirit of those developed by Obstfeld & Rogoﬀ (1996)
in which the structure of each regional economy is similar to that of other
applied overlapping generations (OLG) general equilibrium models (such as
Auerbach & Kotlikoﬀ (1987)) except that labour supply is exogenous. The
world is divided into ten regions according to geographical and demographic
criteria. The GDP growth rate of each region depends mainly on its demo-
graphic evolution and on the assumptions regarding catch up of total factor
productivity.
With this general equilibrium model, we can have useful insights on the im-
pact of the asynchronous ageing processes on international capital ﬂows and
interest rates. Current population structures and demographic projections
for the various regions of the world show that the ageing process is not syn-
chronous. This diﬀerence in time proﬁles of demographic changes suggests
that one mechanism through which the pressure on pension systems could
be eased is inter-temporal trade in the form of international capital ﬂows.
The `triangular' relationship between population aging, pension reform, and
international capital markets receives increasing attention in the academic
literature, Brooks (2003), Börsch-Supan, Ludwig & Winter (2006), Aglietta
et al. (2007) and Krueger & Ludwig (2007).
To the best of our knowledge, none of these world general equilibrium ana-
lyzes includes an explicit modeling of international migration. Storesletten
(2000) and Chojnicki, Docquier & Ragot (2005) investigate whether a re-
form of immigration policies could attenuate the ﬁscal burden of ageing in
the coming decades in a closed economy framework. Only two studies (Fehr,
Jokisch & Kotlikoﬀ (2003, 2004)) have treated international migration in
multi-country open-economy CGE-OLG models. These studies develop a
three country model (US, Europe and Japan) to study the macroeconomic
1The INGENUE 2 model was developed at CEPII, CEPREMAP and OFCE by
Michel Aglietta (CEPII), Vladimir Borgy (CEPII), Jean Chateau (OECD), Michel Juil-
lard (CEPREMAP), Jacques Le Cacheux (OFCE), Gilles Le Garrec (OFCE) and Vincent
Touzé (OFCE).
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eﬀects of increased immigration on the three countries' pension systems.
Even if they use an open economy framework, the impact of immigration
on the sending countries and on inter-country inequalities are not treated.
Compared to these studies, our paper oﬀers a global perspective on the conse-
quences of international migration. Indeed, the value-added of the INGENUE
2 model is that it is able to analyze the eﬀects of international migration on
both the destination and the origin regions.2 The three major challenges
facing the world economy, the sustainability of the public pension system,
growth perspectives, income inequalities can thus be analyzed taking explic-
itly into account prospective international migration ﬂows. Consequently,
the following questions are addressed: what is the impact of migration on
economic growth, capital accumulation, consumption, pension schemes and
the current accounts of sending and receiving countries? Can immigration
help mitigate the adverse eﬀects of population ageing in OECD countries?
A further innovation of our world general equilibrium OLG model is that
international migration is treated as endogenous. Indeed, some of the en-
dogenous variables in this type of model are likely to aﬀect the size of inter-
national migration ﬂows (GDP per capita diﬀerential, demographic structure
in the origin countries, poverty in the origin countries, stock of migrants in
the destination countries). Nevertheless, existing world general equilibrium
models assume exogenous migration scenarios (no migration, trend migra-
tion, increase of migration by a ﬁxed proportion with respect to current
levels). To endogenize international migration in Ingenue, we develop a two-
step strategy. In a ﬁrst step, we draw on the literature on the estimation
of the determinants of international migration (Clark, Hatton & Williamson
(2007), Mayda (2006), Zaiceva (2006)) to estimate the determinants of inter-
national migrations. Our econometric results are close to the ones of Clark
et al. (2007) except that our estimations are done in a multi destination coun-
tries framework. In a second step, we introduce the estimated elasticities into
INGENUE 2 and model the interdependence between these determinants (as
GDP, GDP per capita, distance, common language, demographic structure,
inequality and poverty indicators) and international ﬂows explicitly.
With this interaction between the demographic part and the economic part of
the world OLG model INGENUE 2, we are able to project dynamic endoge-
nous migration ﬂows. Compared to the United-Nations (2006) projections,
our methodology induces important changes in the volume and the distribu-
2Docquier & Marchiori (2007) also develop such a uniﬁed framework to evaluate the
impact of immigration policies on receiving and sending countries. However, their model
is based on a more stylized framework and does not treat international migration as
endogenous.
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tion of the migration ﬂows between regions. For example, net migration ﬂows
from Africa are almost four times higher compared to the United-Nations
(2006) projections in 2050. Nevertheless, one must note that this realistic
migration scenario, even if it induces a sharp increase in migration ﬂows, does
not totally oﬀset the eﬀect of ageing in the regions receiving the migrants:
in this regard, pension reforms appear to be necessary in order to deal with
the ageing problem that these regions will face in a near future. Concern-
ing the regions losing migrants, the adverse consequences of emigration are
more important the more the region is advanced in the ageing process (and
is already suﬀering from a declining population). For example, the negative
impact of emigration on contribution rates is two times higher in Eastern
Europe than in the Mediterranean world even though the emigration rate is
two times lower in Eastern Europe.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our demo-
graphic model. The macroeconomic model is presented in Section 3. The
calibration and the baseline results without migration are given in Section
4. Economic study of international migrations follows in Section 5. Section
6 endogenizes migration ﬂows in the context of our world model. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Demographics
The World is divided in 10 regions according mainly to geographical and
demographic criteria. These regions are labeled: Western Europe, Eastern
Europe, North America, Latin America, Japan, Mediterranean World, Chi-
nese World, Africa, Russian World and Indian World. The content of each
region is detailed in Appendix 1.
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2.1 Population structure and projection method
The period of the model is set to ﬁve years. In each region z, the economy is
populated by 21 overlapping generations who live up to a maximum age of
105. For notational purposes, age is denoted by a ∈ [0, . . . , 20]. The number
of people of age a at time t is denoted by Lza(t). At date t the number of
"births" (individuals between 0 and 4 years old) is then denoted by Lz0(t)
and total population alive at time t in the region z is Lz(t) =
∑20
a=0 L
z
a(t).
Between ages 15 and 50, women give birth to fraction of children at the
beginning of each period (Figure 2). Our agents can die at any age and the
probability of death is one at age 105.
Figure 2: The individual life cycle
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Population evolution is calculated according to a standard population pro-
jection method on the basis of historical and prospective UN data. For that
purpose, a simple demographic model has been developed, allowing us to
generate projections that are consistent with United-Nations data. First, we
aggregate the population structure across the countries of each region with
the UN data from 1950 to 1995. Then we project fertility, net migration
ﬂows and mortality trends (for both sexes) at the region-aggregate level.
This, together with initial population structures in 1995, allows us to obtain
the evolution of the population at a world level from 2000 until the ending
date of the model. With some usual population projection methods, the evo-
lutions of mortality and fertility tables are constructed on the only basis of
life expectancy and global fertility rates evolutions in the future.
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At each time, the number of births is equal to:
Lz0(t) =
9∑
a=3
f za (t)Lfa
z(t) (1)
where Lfa
z(t) is the female population of age a at time t and f za is the
average age-speciﬁc fertility rate. At each time, we calibrate f za for the 10
geographical regions so that the number of births matches the UN ﬁgures
until 2050.
Some people die before 105 years old ; if sa denotes the conditional probability
of surviving between age a and age a+1, the number of age a−1 individuals
then follows :
Lza(t) = s
z
a−1(t− 1) · Lza−1(t− 1) +
∑
z∗
M z∗a (t) for all a > 0 (2)
with M z∗a (t) the number of net migrants that enter or leave the country
to/from country Z∗. We thus have M z∗a (t) > 0 in case of immigration and
M z∗a (t) < 0 in case of emigration.
For population projections, we then need some process to describe the evo-
lution of {sza−1(t − 1)}a>0 for t = 2000, . . . , T (for both sexes). For this, we
ﬁrst have to set initial and ﬁnal mortality tables. The starting tables are
taken from UN data between years 1995 and 2000. The ending table are cho-
sen among UN "typical" long run mortality tables (from Coale & Demeny
(1966)). According to UN methods, we extrapolate future mortality tables
on the basis of an expected trend for life expectancy. We adopt a linear
process of convergence.
In the baseline scenario, we implicitly assume that there is no migration
ﬂows in the future (M z∗a (t) = 0) so that the population evolution is only
given by mortality and fertility assumptions. Our baseline population pro-
jection thus corresponds to the UN variant with no migration ﬂows. Then,
we build a comprehensive migratory scenario to analyze the demographic
and economic consequences of international migration. Unlike fertility and
mortality, which are in transition worldwide from high to low levels in a long
historical process, there is much more uncertainty concerning net migration
(see National-Research-Council (2000), Alho & Borgy (2008)). Therefore,
migration projections have no strong and consistent trend that can serve
as the backbone of credible projection assumptions for the future. For this
reason, it is important to assess migration potential of these regions by an-
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alyzing the main driving forces of the past and recent trends. Assumptions
related to migratory ﬂows are then developed in details in Section 5 and 6.
After 2050, the demographic model is calibrated in order for the population
to converge towards a stationary level.
2.2 Main demographic features of the baseline scenario
Our baseline scenario reproduces UN projections with no migration through
2050. According to our demographic forecasts, the world population reaches
9.3 billions in 20503. Population of the Asian world grows at a sustained
pace and reaches 31% of the world population against 28.3% in 2000 (see
Figure 3(a)). The population of the Chinese world increases at a very low
pace between 2030 and its culmination in 2050. As a consequence, the share
of the population of this region decreases during the ﬁrst part of the 21st
century (from 27% to 22%). The population of the African region grows at
the highest pace in our projections given the high fertility rates that char-
acterize the countries included in this region. The Mediterranean region is
also characterized by a dynamic demography with a doubling population on
the ﬁrst half of the century. On the contrary, Western Europe population is
relatively stable until 2020 and then clearly diminishes. This ﬁgure is even
more pronounced for Eastern Europe and the Russian world with a total
population that begins to decline immediately (respectively -15% and -30%
between 2000 and 2050).
A sharp contrast arises in the rate of growth of the labor force (Figure 3(b)).
Without migration, it declines throughout the half century in Russian world
(very fast), Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Japan. It declines more
moderately in North America (after 2010) and the Chinese world (after 2020).
It decelerates but grows until 2050 in Latin America, Asia and the Mediter-
ranean countries. The most atypical region is Africa where the labor force
hardly decelerates at all. From an economic point of view, as a consequence
of the dynamism of their working-age population, these regions will need a lot
of capital to equip their numerous workers. As the leading OECD countries
concentrate the largest part of world capital, the growth regime of the world
economy will depend on international capital rather than labor mobility.
An intergenerational transfer of resources via capital export from the rich
ageing countries to the labor force growing countries makes regions strongly
interdependent. One can see on Figure 3(c) that the proportion of high
3The historical data (between 1950 and 2000) come from the UN database.
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savers in total population4 follows a wave pattern that propagates from one
region of the world to the next through the decades. The ratio culminates
ﬁrst in Japan as soon as 1995 and remains at a high level until 2030. Then,
North America experiences its maximum in 2025 and Western Europe in
2030, Eastern Europe, Russian and Chinese world after this date. All are
regions with declining labor force and thus hamper growth in the future. On
the contrary, the regions found on Figure 3(b) as the potentially fast-growing
regions see a progressive ageing leading to an increase of the high savers ratio
which does not culminate before 2050. It follows that saving will ﬂow from
early high savers to late high savers in the coming decades.
Finally, this ageing phenomenon is summarized on ﬁgure 3(d) that presents
the evolution of the old age dependency ratio (retirees in percentage of total
working age population). While the fact of population ageing is common
to all regions (except Africa), extent and timing diﬀer substantially. For
example, this ratio doubles in the case of Western Europe on the ﬁrst half
of the XXIst century and is expected to be almost 80% in 2050 when it is
expected to be only around 35% in the same time in the Mediterranean world.
It should be noted that Eastern Europe and the Russian World are more
severely aﬀected by ageing. The resulting asynchronous demographic ageing
raises numerous issues for pension schemes concerning notably replacement
migration. Indeed, developed countries have an incentive to increase legal
immigration since this would alleviate the ﬁnancial burden on the public
retirement system by limiting the increase of the dependency ratio and the
contribution rate.
4In this OLG model with life cycle behavior, the high saver populations are the cohorts
aged between 45 and 69 years.
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3 INGENUE 2: A long term model for the
world economy
Our economic simulations are performed with the computable, general equi-
librium, multi-regional overlapping-generations model INGENUE 25. Each
of the ten regions is made of three categories of economic agents: households,
ﬁrms and a Pay As You Go (PAYG) retirement pension system. Further-
more, we assume the existence of a ﬁctive producer of a world intermediate
good6.
3.1 Household behavior
The individual life-cycle of a representative agent is described in Figure 2.
Between ages 0 and 20, agents are children and are supported by their par-
ents. Given the speciﬁcities of developing countries, we assume that children
can begin to work at age 10 but their income is included in their parents'
income. At age 21, agents become independent and start working. When
becoming independent, individuals make economic decisions according to the
life cycle hypothesis. A voluntary bequest is left to children at age 80 condi-
tional on survival until 80.
In the budget constraint (see Equation 5 in Appendix 2), the expenditures
consist of consumption (including costs of children) and saving in each age
and each period. On the income side there is, ﬁrst, the return on accumulated
saving corrected by one-period survival probabilities. Second, there is non-
ﬁnancial income that depends on age: labor income (after social security
taxes) adjusted by a region-speciﬁc age proﬁle of labor force participation
for people in full labor activity; a mix of labor income and pension beneﬁts
for people partially retired (reduced labor activity); full pension beneﬁts for
people entirely retired. The lifetime utility (Equation 4) is maximized under
the intertemporal budget constraint, taking prices, social contributions and
beneﬁts as given (Modigliani (1986)). Like Fehr, Jokisch & Kotlikoﬀ (2004),
we do not distinguish between natives and immigrants in the model once the
immigrants have joined the destination country.
5For technical features of the new INGENUE 2 model, as well as the baseline scenario
and a sensitivity analysis of the main structural parameters, see Ingenue (2007).
6This presentation of the multi-region model is completed by a technical appendix.
The equations mentioned in this section are presented in detail in Appendix 2.
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3.2 The public sector
The public sector is reduced to a social security department. It is a Pay-
As-You-Go (PAYG) public pension scheme, that is supposed to exist in all
regions of the world. It is ﬁnanced by a payroll tax on all labor incomes
and pays pensions to retired households. The regional PAYG systems oper-
ate according to a deﬁned-beneﬁt rule. The exogenous parameters are the
retirement age and the replacement ratio. They are region-speciﬁc and the
contribution rate is determined so as to balance the budget, period by period
(Equation 7).
3.3 The production side and the world capital market
In order to deal with relative price movements of foreign and domestic goods
we assume that the diﬀerent countries produce diﬀerent, imperfectly sub-
stitutable intermediate goods using labor and capital (Equation 8). In the
spirit of Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1995), we assume that the domestic
composite ﬁnal good of each region is produced according to a combination
of the domestic intermediate good and an homogenous world good imported
by the region from a world market (Equation 11). In order to simplify the
exchanges of intermediate goods between regions of the world, this homoge-
nous world good is "produced" by a ﬁctive world producer as the output of
a combination of all intermediate goods exported by the regions (Equation
12).
In each type of sector, ﬁrms act on competitive markets. They maximize
their proﬁt under their production constraint, taking prices as given. In the
domestic intermediate good sector, the constraint is intertemporal since the
production function depends on the stock of capital which is depreciated
and accumulated. Intermediate goods producers thus maximize net present
value of future cash ﬂows, i.e. production values minus wage cost and capital
cost. The latter depends on the depreciation rate which is itself aﬀected by
international capital market imperfection.
More precisely, the depreciation rate is asymmetrically dependent on the
ownership ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of the total wealth of households to the
capital stock (see Equation 14). Indeed, ﬁrms located in countries that are
indebted to the rest of the world borrow at a higher interest rate than the
world interest rate and this "indebtedness premium" is proportional to its ﬁ-
nancial market exposure (measured by the ownership ratio). At equilibrium,
the marginal return of capital thus depends on the net external position. In
13
net debtor regions (ownership ratio less than one), the imperfection of inter-
national ﬁnancial markets raises the cost of capital. It shows up in a higher
rate of depreciation of the capital stock which in turns reduces the incentive
to produce the intermediate good. In net creditor regions (ownership ratio
above one), the rate of depreciation is a constant, thus independent from the
ﬁnancial position.
3.4 Technological catch-up
The basic trends that shape the future growth regime are demographic transi-
tion (assumptions on fertility, mortality and net migrations) and the diﬀusion
of technological progress. These factors have always been prevalent in the
rise of capitalism worldwide and they explain the current and future trends
in term of convergence (or divergence) in real income per capita between
countries.
All production functions are augmented by Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
at constant prices which is a synthetic measure of technological progress for
the whole economy. Estimating TFP is a diﬃcult task for the ten world
regions of the INGENUE 2 model. We deﬁne TFP as a Hicksian neutral
technological progress in a Solow growth model. It means that there exits a
production frontier that shifts over time. The level of TFP is exogenous and
grows at a constant rate, in each region. For 1950 until 2000, the growth
rate of TFP is given by historical data (Heston, Summers & Aten (2002)).
After this date, the TFP growth rate is the result of a given, exogenous
growth of 1.1% per annum in the North American region, supposed to be
the technological leader, and a region-speciﬁc exogenous, catch-up factor,
reﬂecting international diﬀusion of technological progress.
Figure 4 shows the proﬁle of TFP in the ten regions of the INGENUE 2
model. Western Europe and Japan are assumed to resume their catch-up,
meaning that they absorb the IT revolution after North America. Three
regions have a sustained catch-up process: the takeoﬀ in the Chinese world
and the Indian world, which started in the 1990's is assumed to gain momen-
tum. Eastern Europe is also assumed to be a fast-growing region due to its
participation to the European Union. We take a dimmer view of the other re-
gions. A relatively slow catching up is assumed in South America and in the
Mediterranean countries where there are perennial diﬃculties in establish-
ing eﬃcient market institutions, in promoting a large class of entrepreneurs
and in generating non-corrupt and competent governments. The same arises
more seriously in Russia where the catastrophic decline of the population is
14
a further handicap. Finally, we are more pessimistic about Africa where we
assume no catch-up in the level of TFP. Yet the rise in TFP at the same rate
of the leading region, even if it entails no catch-up, is a marked improvement
compared to the last quarter of a century which saw no progress at all and
thus a relative setback on the rest of the world.
Figure 4: Total Factor Productivity: 1950-2100 (% of North American level)
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
N. America W. Europe Japan S. America Mediterranean
Africa Russia China India E. Europe
sources: Heston et al. (2002), authors' calculation
4 Baseline path in the case without migration
4.1 Solving the model
The baseline scenario is the outcome of a long and weary process of cali-
bration. To put the model on an acceptable track on the projection phase
starting in 2000, the model computation shall begin at an initial date as far
as in the past as the data permit it. The initialization begins in 1950 where
initial stock of capital, household assets and an age distribution of savings
are estimated. Exogenous variables and parameters are the demographic
proﬁles in each region that are outputs of the demographic upstream model;
the coeﬃcients of the TFP determination in intermediary and ﬁnal sector of
each region; and the social security policy parameters in each region.
15
The competitive world equilibrium stems from ﬁve set of equations: intertem-
poral utility maximization of households; intertemporal proﬁt maximization
of ﬁrms in intermediate goods sectors; period proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms in
ﬁnal goods sectors; period proﬁt maximization of the world producer; and
market clearing conditions. The markets for intermediate goods, ﬁnal goods,
labor in each region, and the market for the world intermediate good, are
cleared in each period. These equations determine all relative equilibrium
prices expressed in a common numeraire, which is the price of the interme-
diate good in North America. This convention allows us to express values in
constant dollars. Finally, Walras' law implies that the world ﬁnancial market
equilibrium is the redundant equation.
4.2 The world economy's baseline transition path
We now turn to our simulated baseline policy transition paths for the 10
regions. Here, we only try to give the main intuitions necessary to understand
how the model works (see Ingenue (2007, 2007b) for a complete description
of the baseline). Results of the migration scenario will be presented with
more details.
Regional growth
Growth in the world economy is shaped by secular trends in its most struc-
tural long-run determinants, i.e. the change in the demographic structure in
the diﬀerent parts of the world and the diﬀusion of technological progress.
As previously detailed, assumptions regarding technological convergence are
conservative in the baseline scenario. Besides, the parameters that deﬁne
public pension systems perpetuate existing policies in the beginning of the
XXIst century. Therefore the pattern of the GDP regional growth rates
largely follows that of the regional labor force growth rates.
Two characteristics stand out (see Figure 5(a)). Firstly, there is a general
slowdown in growth because the working age population growth rate di-
minishes in all regions except Africa after 2000. Secondly, the dispersion
in the growth rates is almost as large in 2050 as in 2000, because ageing
is a lengthy process with countervailing impacts on the labor force of less-
developed countries. Nevertheless convergence in total factor productivity
has an impact since the dispersion in the growth rates of the labor force is
substantially higher in 2050 than in 2000, while the dispersion in the GDP
growth rates is slightly lower.
16
Investment and saving
Gross investment rises with net capital accumulation and with replacement,
which is modulated by the change in the rate of depreciation in debtor re-
gions. Therefore, in regions with a fast growth of the labor force and high
foreign indebtedness, raising markedly the rate of economic depreciation, the
rate of gross investment to GDP increases until 2030.
Net saving in each region is the aggregate of individual savings in the life
cycle. It depends on the demographic structure (high savers ratio and de-
pendency ratio), on the expectation of future income and on the parameters
of PAYG pension systems. Demographic determinants are prevalent. Re-
gions with the fastest-increasing dependency ratios are the ones with the
fastest-decreasing net saving rates, namely Japan, Western Europe, Eastern
Europe and the Russian world (Figure 5(b)). Meanwhile, this gloomy demo-
graphic factor is compounded with a slow expected progression in income.
In the Chinese World, the Indian World, South America and the Mediter-
ranean world, the high saver ratio and the dependency ratio rise in tandem.
In the early decades, while the population is still young, those regions grow
faster than more demographically mature ones. It follows that young people
expecting higher future income indulge in debt, reducing the overall saving
rate.
Interest rates and capital ﬂows
According to the model, the world real interest rate declines over the ﬁfty
years period. This is due to global ageing. Figures 3(b) and 3(c) show
that the working age population decelerates while the age group of high
savers is growing in one region after another. As a result, the world saving-
investment balance is tilted more and more towards a lower interest rate.
This downward trend provides the general proﬁle of regional real interest
rates (see Figure 5(c)). The hierarchy of regional real interest rates is linked
to the rate of change of the real exchange rates which regulate investment and
saving ﬂows. The gap between investment and saving is the current account
balance of each region. It is ﬁnanced by capital ﬂows whose amounts are such
that yield diﬀerentials between diﬀerent regions cancel out in every period.
The world ﬁnancial equilibrium allocates capital ﬂows so as to ﬁnance cur-
rent account imbalances. The magnitude of ﬁnancial positions is measured
by ownership ratios which are determined by cumulative current account
balances. The most striking feature is the divergent proﬁle of North Amer-
17
ica (see ﬁgure 5(d)). With a population consistently younger than in Japan
and Europe, the rise in saving in North America is translated into a double
improvement in the current account balance and the ownership ratio.
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5 Consequences of international migration ﬂows
We now turn to analyzing demographic and economic consequences of in-
ternational migration ﬂows. We begin with a description of a traditional
exogenous migration scenario that we compare with our baseline so as to
understand the mechanisms related to the introduction of migration in such
a world model.
For that purpose, an immigration shock is introduced into the model as
an increase in the number of young adults (aged between 21 and 24, i.e.
M z∗a (t) = 0 if a 6= 4). After crossing the border, immigrants automatically
become natives in an economic sense, i.e. they have the same preferences
and fertility behavior as natives and adjust to the productivity of the host
region. Furthermore, as in Storesletten (2000), we assume that immigrants
move into receiving countries without any capital (Note that natives have no
wealth at the same age).7 However, this choice seems to play a minor part
for the results since most immigrants actually move before the age of 30, i.e.
at the beginning of the wealth accumulation process.
5.1 Calibration of migration ﬂows compatible with UN
projections
International migrants are unevenly distributed across world regions. By
2005, 47% of the stock of international migrants were resident in industrial
countries and 53% in developing countries. The United-States, Canada and
Australia (these 3 countries are regrouped the North America region in the
INGENUE 2 framework) are the major traditional countries of permanent
immigration. Over one quarter of immigrants live in one of these 3 countries.
Western Europe has experienced net ﬂows of immigration for four decades
and represents the second major immigration area with 21% of the total im-
migrant stock. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union had around 15%
of total immigrant stock in 2005. Migration in these regions follow a broad
biaxial pattern: one axis has developed migration among the countries of
Western, Central and Eastern Europe and the other one has arisen among
the CIS countries (World-Bank (2006)). For example, Russia receives 75% of
its immigrants from other CIS countries and over 70% of migrants fromWest-
ern ECA (Europe and Central Asia regions) go to Western Europe. Finally,
other regions are broadly characterized by a predominant labor migration
7These assumptions are necessary to avoid problems of agent heterogeneity that would
complicate the computation of the transitory path.
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through developed countries.
Following these facts and given data availability, our model essentially relies
on migration ﬂows toward the traditional countries of immigration. Thus,
we distinguish 3 types of regions in the model:8
• pure immigration zones only face inward ﬂows: Western Europe and
North America;
• pure emigration zones only face outward ﬂows: Latin America, Mediter-
ranean World, Chinese World, Africa and Indian World;
• intermediate zones face simultaneously in- and outﬂows: Eastern Eu-
rope and Russian World.
We then adopt a calibration process that allows us to make actual net migra-
tion ﬂows compatible with our multi-regions description of the world using
diﬀerent data sources. First, we aggregate net migration ﬂows by countries
used in the medium variant of 2006 UN population projections (United-
Nations (2006)) to correspond to the INGENUE2 regional grouping. Then,
we calibrate immigration ﬂows to Western Europe, North America, Eastern
Europe and the Russian World on UN ﬁgures removing intra-regional ﬂows
(for example German migration to France) as well as non pertinent ﬂows
for our analysis (for instance Western Europe migrations to North Amer-
ica). Given the world aspect of our model, immigration in host regions has
to correspond to emigration in sending regions. Thus, we have to allocate
immigration ﬂows by origin regions. For that purpose, we use at ﬁrst the
emigration stocks and rates of 195 origin countries built by Docquier & Mar-
fouk (2005) to allocate the immigration ﬂows to Western Europe and North
America.
However, Docquier & Marfouk (2005)'s database focuses on OECD coun-
tries as receiving countries and there is no information on migration ﬂows
to Eastern Europe and the Russian world. Thus, for the two intermediate
regions, we complete with the World Bank report on Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union (World-Bank (2006)) as well as with the data of Salt
(2005). Table 1 gives the calibrated net migration ﬂows by regions in 2005.
Note that these calibrated ﬂows appear lower than the UN oﬃcial net ﬂows
given that we exclude intra-regional ﬂows as well as many ﬂows between de-
veloping countries. These ﬂows thus represent almost 43% of the total net
8Given the weakness of oﬃcial ﬁgures, we assume that Japan is isolated to international
mobility of workers: there is thus neither immigration nor emigration to Japan.
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ﬂows following from the United-Nations (2006) study and correspond to the
greater part of migration through OECD countries.
Table 1: Yearly net migration ﬂows by origin and destination countries in
2005 (in thousand)
 
Western Europe North America Eastern Europe Russian World Total Emigration
Mediterranean World 256.8 86.1 0.9 53.2 397.0
Indian World 58.5 107.0 0.3 54.6 220.5
Chinese World 41.7 316.7 1.2 0.0 359.6
Eastern Europe 53.0 21.6 - 0.0 74.5
Russian World 36.7 46.5 21.9 - 105.0
Latin America 51.8 649.3 0.1 0.0 701.3
Africa 125.3 69.8 0.1 0.0 195.3
Total Immigration 623.8 1297.1 24.6 107.8 2053.3
Sources : Docquier and Marfouk (2005), Salt (2005), United-Nations (2006), World Bank (2006); Authors' calculations
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We have to reproduce this methodology for each ﬁve-year period in the future.
Thus, we simply calibrate our migration ﬂows to match the UN projections
with migrations until 2050. Given the long run feature of INGENUE 2, we
need to make some assumptions on migration ﬂows far in the future. Between
2050 and 2100, we keep emigration rates constant at their 2050 values so that
migration ﬂows only evolve with the number of young workers in emigration
area. After 2100, migration ﬂows progressively reduce and are nil in 2150
in order for the population to converge towards a stationary level. This
scenario is thus close to the United-Nations migration projection assuming
that migration streams observed in lasting decades are durable and relatively
predictable. Table 3 gives the dynamics of net migration ﬂows until 2050.
5.2 Results of the conventional migration scenario
The results of our comprehensive migration scenario are compared to the
benchmark with no migration. The eﬀects of the shock on the main demo-
graphic and macroeconomic variables are presented in Figure 6 (expressed
as deviations from the benchmark).
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The introduction of international migration in our demographic model strongly
modiﬁes the international distribution and the age structure of the world pop-
ulation for the concerned regions. North America and Western Europe are
the only zone that faces up to large immigration ﬂows (the Russian world
also exhibits the features of an immigration zone on the whole period but to
a lower extent) when other regions (except Japan) are net emigrations zones
(Figure 6(a)). Thus, North America, Western Europe and the Russian world
have a total population respectively 34.9%, 18.4% and 0.4% higher than in
the baseline case in 2050. At the same time, the population of Latin Amer-
ica, Mediterranean world and Eastern Europe is respectively 9.1%, 6.5% and
3.9% lower. Other emigration regions are less aﬀected by migration ﬂows.
International migration ﬂows also modify the age structure of the world pop-
ulation since migrants are assumed to be young workers (aged 20-24). In
2050, the dependency ratio is almost 17 points lower than in the baseline
case in Western Europe (Figure 6(b)), 14.1 points in North America and 4.5
point lower in the Russian world. At this horizon, it increases by about 3.8
points in Eastern Europe and 1.7 points in Mediterranean World9. It follows
that the ﬁnancing of the PAYG pension system is substantially improved
(resp. deteriorated) in North America, Western Europe and in the Russian
world (resp. in sending regions) in line with the dependency ratio evolu-
tion. For example, the contribution rate reaches 28% in Western Europe in
2050 (compared to 31.9% in the baseline case) and 14.3% in North America
(compared to 17.9% in the baseline case) because migrants contribute to its
ﬁnancing (Table 4).
The impact of international migratory ﬂows on the GDP growth rate is far
from being insigniﬁcant. The arrival of young workers progressively increases
the GDP growth rate in North America and Western Europe. It is more than
respectively 0.8 point and 0.5 point higher than in the baseline case in 2035 in
North America and Western Europe and then stabilizes to this gap with the
ageing of ﬁrst migrant cohorts (see Figure 6(f)). The eﬀect on the Russian
world GDP growth rate follows the working age population evolution and
is thus less marked. The mirror eﬀect of the improving economic situation
in immigration regions is a deterioration in the regions of emigration, and
noticeably in Latin America and the Mediterranean world. Indeed, the mag-
9Note that the emigration rate in Eastern Europe is twice lower than in the Mediter-
ranean world. Nevertheless, the negative impact on the dependency ratio is twice higher
in Eastern Europe and is explained by the diﬀerent demographic features between these
two regions. The former is much advanced in the ageing process whereas the latter is still
characterized by a more sustained growth of its working age population. The consequences
of young workers emigration are thus more pronounced in the Eastern Europe case.
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nitude of the deterioration depends on the loss of potential workers relative
to the total labor force in the regions.
Nevertheless, the level of consumption per capita is less than in the baseline
scenario in Western Europe until the very end of the half-century (see Figure
6(g)). The reason lies in the production sector : the inﬂow of workers reduces
capital intensity relative to baseline. Indeed, immigration can be seen as a
supply shock on the labor market, thus impacting on the productivity of
factors supplied by natives. For a given stock of capital, an increase in
labor supply reduces the capital by worker. The marginal productivity of
capital is raised and the interest rate as well. Conversely, labor productivity
is diminished with a lower capital intensity. As a consequence, GDP per
worker is decreased in the regions receiving the migrants and, as a mirror
eﬀect, is increased in the regions sending the migrants (see Figure 6(h)).
These migrations ﬂows from regions with low level of TFP to regions with
higher level of TFP thus induced a convergence process in terms of GDP per
worker diﬀerential.
The real wage rate, being a decreasing function of the return on capital on
the factor price frontier, is itself on a slower path than in baseline in receiving
regions. It ensues that relatively to the baseline scenario, consumption is less
augmented than total population ; hence consumption per capita is lower.
Around 2035, when saving gains momentum (see Figure 6(c)) the interest
rate recedes a bit because saving grows faster than investment. Therefore
the growth of consumption per capita relative to baseline turns positive from
2020 onwards and the level moves overtake the baseline one in 2045. In North
America and the Russian world, the level of consumption per capita is always
lower than in the baseline given the net saving proﬁle.
The opposite occurs in emigrating regions. But the impact is diﬀused over
several regions and mitigated by the size of the labor force. The fall in
the interest rate in these regions and the subsequent increase in productiv-
ity persists for almost the entire span of the ﬁfty year period. Only Latin
America and the Mediterranean world exhibit a non-negligible elevation of
consumption per capita.
Saving increases in the regions receiving the migrants and reaches steadily
high deviations from the baseline scenario (see Figure 6(c)). This comes
from the fact that the stock of ﬁrst generation migrants enters progressively
the high saving stage of their life cycle. In the regions loosing the migrants,
one must note also an increase of saving. Two eﬀects have to be taken
into consideration. On the one hand, from a demographic point of view,
saving should decrease as a consequence of the fall of working age / saver
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population. On the other hand, households have a strong a incentive for
increasing their saving as the world interest rate is substantially higher than
in the baseline scenario. This latter adjustment dominates and reﬂects the
adjustment one must observe in this speciﬁc world setting framework. Indeed,
in the INGENUE 2 model, the world interest rate balances at each period
the capital supply and the capital demand at a world level. In this case,
the higher interest rate reﬂects noticeably the strong increase in investment
(capital demand) in the two regions receiving the migrants.
The saving-investment balance is aﬀected by the migrations ﬂows. In par-
ticular, in the regions receiving the migrants, saving and investment increase
simultaneously (as explained above). The current account balance is more
in surplus in the Western Europe region compared to the baseline case. In
North America, the current account switches from a deﬁcit in the baseline to
a surplus during the period 2010-2015. It follows from the improvement of the
current account balance that North America and Western Europe reinforce
their creditor position in the world economy during the period 2015-2050.
The ownership ratio rises systematically above baseline (see Figure 6(e)).
The regions of emigration with slightly appreciating exchange rates relative
to baseline stay more in deﬁcit and more in debt.
6 Endogenizing migration ﬂows
Unlike fertility and mortality which are in transition worldwide from high
to low levels in long historical process, migration projections have no strong
and consistent trends that can serve as a backbone of credible projections for
the future. Migration is usually treated as a residual factor in demographic
projections and migration projections rely more on informed judgments than
on systematic modeling. For example, United-Nations (2006) projections,
used to build our exogenous migration scenario in Section 5, estimate future
migration by some arbitrary assumptions, such as constant ﬂows in the future
or ﬂows declining toward zero, according to the country considered. This
methodology is somewhat unsatisfactory and involves substantial errors on
projected population, not so at the global level but on speciﬁc countries or
regions.
Nevertheless, the basic motivations for migration are now well known even
if there is no complete migration theory that accounts for all the relevant
factors. The main driving forces of the past and recent trends in migration
ﬂows thus have to be fully analyzed so as to be integrated in a dynamic
27
framework where the demography and the economy interact one on the other.
So as to endogenize international migration, we develop a two step strategy.
In a ﬁrst step, we estimate the dynamics of migration ﬂows on the basis of
selected variables (Section 6.1). In a second step (Section 6.2), we endogenize
migration ﬂows in the INGENUE 2 model: in order to do so, we relate
demographic and macroeconomic dynamics between the regions through the
econometric relation estimated in Section 6.1.
6.1 Estimation of the determinants of international mi-
gration
In order to endogenize migration ﬂows in INGENUE 2, we ﬁrst estimate
the determinants of migration ﬂows using an econometric model similar to
Clark et al. (2007). For that purpose, we use data on international migra-
tion ﬂows from the UN International Migration Flows to and from Selected
Countries (IMSC) dataset that contains information on bilateral migration
ﬂows between the 15 main destination countries and approximately 200 ori-
gin countries between 1946 and 2004. We decide to restrict the empirical
analysis to the time period 1985-2004 for two reasons. Firstly, our empirical
model requires data on bilateral migrant stocks which, for some of the main
destination countries, we are not able to construct before 1985. Secondly, we
want to make sure that the estimated elasticities captures the current rela-
tionship between international migration ﬂows and its determinants instead
of historical relationships before 1985.
Data on PPP adjusted per worker GDP (constant 2000 international dollars)
and population are from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston & Summers,
2006). Average years of schooling are taken from Barro & Lee (2000), the
share of population aged between 15 and 29 years from the International
Labour Organisation Labour Force Statistics and measures of income in-
equality from the United Nations WIDER Institute that are in turn based
on Deininger & Squire (1996). Data on the traditional gravity variables dis-
tance, common language and the existence of a colonial relationship are from
CEPII's distance database10.
Primary information on migrant stocks are from the Docquier & Marfouk
(2005) database that reports migrant stocks for 30 destination countries and
192 origin countries for the years 1990 and 2000. In combination with the
gross migration ﬂows from the United Nations IMSC database, an interpo-
10http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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lation procedure described in Appendix 3 allows us to obtain yearly migrant
stocks for the years 1985-2004.
We estimate the elasticity of migration ﬂows with respect to its main deter-
minants using the following speciﬁcation:
migdot/popot = β0 + β1(yd/yo)t−1 + β2(syrd/syro)t + β3ageot
+β4ineqot + β5(ineqot)
2 + β6povot + β7distdo
+β8comlangdo + β9colonydo + β10(stockdo,t−1/popd,t−1)
+β11(stockdo,t−1/popd,t−1)2 + κdt + κt + dot (3)
where the d subscript points to the destination country, o for the origin and
t for the year. Following the literature (Mayda, 2006 or Clark et al, 2007
among others) we choose the emigration rate, mig/pop, as the dependent
variable of our empirical model.
Migration incentives are represented by the ﬁrst ﬁve terms on the right-
hand side of Equation (3). yd/yo is the (purchasing power parity adjusted)
ratio of income per worker in the destination country relative to the origin
country. This is our main variable of interest and we expect the estimated
coeﬃcient to be positive (β1 > 0). syrd/syro is the ratio of the average years
of schooling in the destination country relative to the origin country. This
variable adjusts the income per worker ratio for diﬀerences in human capital.
For a given income per worker ratio, we expect the migration rate to be
lower when human capital in the origin country is relatively higher relative to
human capital in the destination country, since this would imply a relatively
lower return to human capital in the origin country. We therefore expect the
coeﬃcient on the human capital ratio to be negative (β2 < 0). ageot is the
share of the population aged between 15 and 29 years in the origin country
and is supposed to capture the fact that, at a given level of the income per
worker diﬀerential, the present value of migration is higher at younger ages.
We therefore expect β3 > 0. The variable ineqot measures inequality in the
origin country. Following Clark et al. (2007) and in line with the Roy model,
we assume that the eﬀect of inequality is nonlinear in the sense that increases
in inequality have an upwards eﬀect on the emigration rate at low levels of
inequality but reduce it at high levels (β4 > 0 and β5 < 0).
Migration costs are represented by the remaining terms on the right-hand
side of Equation (3). Poverty in the origin country, povot can be considered
as a constraint on emigration.11 We therefore expect β6 < 0. Geographical
and cultural migration costs are proxied by the traditional gravity variables
11Since there are no data on poverty headcount available for the countries and years in
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distance, distdo, common language, comlangdo, and the presence of a colonial
link, colonydo (β7 < 0, β8 > 0, β9 > 0). We further expect migration costs
to decrease with the presence of an origin country migration network in
period t−1 in the destination country, stockdo,t−1/popot. To capture potential
decreasing returns to network externalities we impose a quadratic structure
of the network variable and expect β10 > 0 and β11 < 0.
We use panel estimation techniques to estimate Equation (3). This allows
us to control for heterogeneity between countries that is not captured by our
explanatory variables. The destination country times year speciﬁc eﬀect κdt
captures all unobserved characteristics of the destination country in a speciﬁc
year, in particular the restrictiveness of its immigration policy. We do not
include origin speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects since the reasons for including them are
less apparent than for the destination country, where we want to control for
unobserved migration policy and unobserved heterogeneity is partly absorbed
in the migration network variables.12 The year speciﬁc eﬀect κt captures time
speciﬁc eﬀects that are common to all destination and origin countries.
We report four sets of estimation results in Table 2. Column (1) reports
results for estimation of speciﬁcation (3) with destination country ﬁxed eﬀects
instead of destination country times year ﬁxed eﬀects. All the coeﬃcients
have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level, except
for the share of the young population in the origin country. In particular the
coeﬃcient on the income per worker diﬀerential is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The marginal eﬀect of the income per worker
diﬀerential on the emigration rate is estimated at 0.003 meaning that an
increase of one percentage point of the GDP per worker ratio implies an
increase of 0.003 percentage point of the emigration rate. Column (2) reports
results for estimation of speciﬁcation (3) with destination country plus year
ﬁxed eﬀects to account for changes in immigration policy in the destination
country. The results do not change qualitatively and the estimated marginal
eﬀect of the income per worker diﬀerential on the emigration rate remains
roughly constant at 0.004. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the estimations using
the origin migration network in the destination country in period t−5 instead
of period t−1 to reduce potential endogeneity of the network variable.13 The
our sample, we follow Clark et al. (2007) and measure poverty by the inverse of income per
capita squared. The rationale is that recent empirical studies ﬁnd the poverty headcount
to be negatively related to the inverse of income per capita squared (Ravallion (2004)).
12Note that this speciﬁcation is the equivalent to the Clark et al. (2007) speciﬁcation in
a setting with multiple destination countries and multiple origin countries.
13Note that this reduces the size of the sample since the network variable cannot be
constructed for the ﬁrst ﬁve years.
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Table 2: Main determinants of international migration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Emigration rate
gdp per cap diﬀ 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
human cap diﬀ -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.006** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
origin share young pop 0.001 0.002 0.003** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
gini origin 0.005** 0.005** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
(gini origin)2 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
origin pov -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
network 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(network)2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln dist -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.066*** -0.065***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
colonial link 0.046** 0.045** 0.064*** 0.049**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
common language 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.132*** 0.121***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Destination FE Yes No Yes No
Destination-year FE No Yes No Yes
N 13295 13295 10274 10274
R2 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.55
Standard errors in parentheses
Signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Source: Authors' calculations.
31
coeﬃcient on the share of the young population in the origin country now
turns signiﬁcant at the 1% level and has the expected sign while the other
results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Among the factors that have been highlighted by the econometric analysis
are some endogenous variables of the INGENUE2 model. Three are retained
to endogenize migration ﬂows14. The ﬁrst two one are related to economic
factors and the third one accounts for network eﬀects: (i) the GDP per worker
diﬀerential captures the fact that many workers move mainly for higher in-
come opportunities ; (ii) the poverty indicator measures a constraint to the
migration in the origin country ; (iii) an accumulated stock of immigrants
in a speciﬁc country encourages migration in direction of this country for
future years. Then, estimated marginal eﬀects presented in Table 2 allow
us to back out a range for the elasticity of the emigration rate with respect
to each of the three retained factors. For example, using σ ≡ β1 (yd/yo)(mig/pop)do ,
at the sample median for (yd/yo)
(mig/pop)do
, this elasticity would range from 0.43 to
0.57 for the per worker income diﬀerentials. Given that a period is set to 5
years in the INGENUE 2 model, we choose speciﬁcation 4 so as to endoge-
nize migration ﬂows and adopt an elasticity of 0.43 for the per worker income
diﬀerentials. The interpretation is that a 10% increase of the per worker in-
come ratio involves a 4.3% increase of the emigration rate. Following the
same methodology, we infer elasticities of the emigration rate with respect to
the poverty indicator and with respect to accumulated stock of immigrants,
respectively equal to -0.03 and 0.43.
6.2 Results with endogenous migration
The INGENUE 2 model displays a number of endogenous variables, including
GDP per worker for each period and each region of the model as well as the
evolution of the stock of migrants in the receiving regions. As a consequence,
we compute the endogenous migration ﬂows using a dynamic feedback loop,
in order to take into account the endogenous adjustments of the economic
variables of the model that enter the econometric relation.
Some migration streams are durable, lasting decades, and relatively pre-
14We thus assume that the other determinants of emigration rates included in Equation
3 remain constant for the entire projection period. Even though it is naturally the case for
some of them (ex: distance, common language, colonial link), we are aware of the limit of
this partial integration of the migration determinants in our CGE framework. However,
given the complexity of the task, we leave to further research a more complete integration
of migration determinants in such a world model.
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dictable. This is particularly the case of some types of migration such as
labor migration or family reuniﬁcation that tend to perpetuate themselves
over time. Consequently, the migration ﬂows that are strongest and most
likely to endure are probably the ﬂows toward the traditional countries of
immigration. In this work, we only consider Western Europe and North
America as the two only receiving regions that would be concerned by en-
dogenous migration ﬂows in the context of the Ingenue 2 model. Indeed,
Eastern Europe and the Russian World, as potential receiving regions, are
excluded from this endogenous migration process given that the recent pe-
riod has been mainly marked by ethnic and conﬂict-driven migration that
are by deﬁnition unpredictable.
The methodology to endogenize migration ﬂows is relatively simple. The
starting point for migration is still the year 2005 and the ﬂows for the ﬁrst
period (2005-2009) thus remain the same as the one calibrated in the ex-
ogenous scenario. Then, the 14 bilateral emigration rates of the ﬁrst period
(2 destination regions and 7 origin regions) are modiﬁed on the basis of
the endogenous evolution of the 3 determinants of international migration
and of the 3 related elasticities following the econometric analysis of Sec-
tion 6.1. We then obtain 14 new bilateral emigration rates for the period
2010-2014, which allows us to calibrate new migration ﬂows for this period.
These new migration ﬂows then modify the macroeconomic dynamic of the
INGENUE2 model, for example the GDP per worker evolution, and create a
dynamic feedback loop between migration projections and the demographic
and macroeconomic evolutions.15 This methodology is replicated for each
period until 2050. After this date, migration ﬂows progressively decline and
are nil in 2150 as in the exogenous scenario.
The results of the endogenous migrations scenario are presented in Table 3
where we compare exogenous migration ﬂows of the United-Nations (2006)
scenario (the one presented in Section 5) to endogenous migration ﬂows for
the period 2006-2050. Taking into account traditional economic and de-
mographic determinants of migration ﬂows (GDP per worker diﬀerential,
poverty in origin countries and network eﬀect) induces important changes in
the volume and the distribution of the migration ﬂows between regions com-
15Note that emigration rates are calibrated in a single step process at each period. In-
deed, once emigration rates are ﬁxed for a given year, endogenizing migration for future
period slightly modiﬁes the dynamic of macroeconomic variables such as the GDP per
worker diﬀerential given the perfect foresight assumption of the INGENUE2 model. How-
ever, these changes are very marginal compared to the ﬁrst order eﬀect on emigration
rates and we thus choose not to include these second order eﬀects so as to simplify the
simulation process.
33
pared to the United-Nations (2006) scenario. Indeed, some sending regions
face substantial increase of their net migration ﬂows on the mid-century hori-
zon -for example, net migration ﬂows from Africa and from the Mediterranean
World are respectively almost four times and one time higher compared to
the United-Nations (2006) projection- when other regions, such as the Chi-
nese World are clearly less aﬀected. Despite everything, the general evolution
of migration ﬂows for the ﬁve pure emigration regions is clearly on higher
trends and logically transcripts into higher immigration for pure immigration
regions. Western Europe, as a receiving region, is more concerned by this
phenomenon than North America: the number of migrants in 2050 increases
from 1.1 million to 1.9 million in North America (+63%); in Western Europe
the number of migrants increase by 173%, reaching 1.5 million in 2050.
Table 3: Comparison of yearly net migration ﬂows between the UN and the
endogenous migration scenario (in thousand)
2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 2026-2030 2046-2050
Mediterranean World UN 06 -397 -350 -341 -344 -344
Endo. Flows -397 -442 -491 -604 -867
Indian World UN 06 -220 -205 -203 -204 -204
Endo. Flows -220 -237 -254 -287 -346
Chinese World UN 06 -360 -333 -330 -331 -331
Endo. Flows -360 -368 -376 -382 -366
Latin America UN 06 -701 -653 -648 -649 -649
Endo. Flows -701 -762 -816 -927 -1 120
Africa UN 06 -195 -169 -165 -166 -166
Endo. Flows -195 -233 -278 -391 -715
Eastern Europe UN 06 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50
Endo. Flows -50 -47 -44 -39 -26
Russian World UN 06 3 5 5 5 5
Endo. Flows 3 -1 -3 -4 -4
Western Europe UN 06 654 564 546 551 551
Endo. Flows 624 702 788 992 1 504
North America UN 06 1 267 1 193 1 186 1 188 1 188
Endo. Flows 1 297 1 390 1 474 1 643 1 936
Sources:United-Nations (2006), Authors' calculations
So as to clarify the mechanism behind these results, Figure 7 displays the
number of migrants in 2050 for the diﬀerent regions of the model according to
several intermediary scenarios: we decompose between constant emigration
rates 16, endogenous ﬂows without network eﬀect and complete endogenous
ﬂows. We see that switching from the United-Nations (2006) scenario, that
implies a net decrease of emigration rates for all sending regions, to the
constant emigration rate induces an increase in migrations ﬂows in all the
regions. This result is logically linked to the total population evolution of
each region (see Section 2.2). Africa, which is still characterized by high
16The constant emigration rate scenario is strictly the same as assuming that there is
no evolution of the 3 determinants of migration ﬂows over time since we simply project
emigration rates changes based on the evolution of the 3 migration ﬂows determinants in
the complete endogenous scenario
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fertility rates through 2050, has still a growing population and is thus the
more aﬀected region by the constant emigration rates scenario.
Figure 7: Disentangling the demographic and economic eﬀects of endogenous
ﬂows
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Introducing the economic determinants of migration, i.e. GDP per worker
diﬀerential and poverty in origin countries (endogenous scenario without net-
work eﬀects), induces additional ﬂows from almost all sending regions (Figure
7). Indeed, the endogenous process of the INGENUE 2 model relies on two
exogenous blocks : the catching up process and the demographic forecasts for
the ten regions of the model. Given the relatively conservative assumptions
regarding the evolution of TFP (see Section 4) and demographic evolutions,
only the Chinese World and Eastern Europe (and to a lower extent the Rus-
sian world) are really acquainted with a catching-up process in term of GDP
per worker compared to Western Europe and North America (Figure 8).
However, as seen with the exogenous scenario (see Section 5), one should
note that the migrations dynamics modiﬁes the catching-up process through
the decrease in the GDP per worker diﬀerential between the receiving and
sending regions (ﬁgure 9(h)).
The comparison of the endogenous scenario without network eﬀects with
the complete endogenous scenario shows that migration ﬂows are enhanced
as we could expect (Figure 7). However, regarding the receiving regions,
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Figure 8: Growth rate of the GDP per worker diﬀerential in the endogenous
ﬂows scenario
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one must note that the network eﬀect does not add a lot of migrants for
the North American region, contrary to the Western Europe region: with
the introduction of the network eﬀect, the number of migrants in 2050 is
nearly the same in North America (+0.4%); in Western Europe the number
of migrants increase by 43%. These diﬀerences on the number of migrants
induced by the network eﬀect could be explained by the fact that the initial
value of installed migrants is already high in 2000: the share of migrants
is equal to 6.2% in Western Europe compared to 13.6% in North America,
according to the United-Nations. As a consequence, the estimated elasticity
that we used applies to a stock of migrants that is substantially higher in the
North American case: new migration ﬂows after 2000 thus have a moderate
impact on the migrants stock evolution. In 2050, the respective shares of
migrants are respectively equal to 14.5% and 17.6%.
Finally, the macroeconomic and demographic consequences of the endoge-
nous migration scenario are qualitatively the same as the exogenous migra-
tion one presented in Section 5 (see Figure 9). However, from a quantitative
point of view, it appears that the economic consequences are enhanced for
the Western Europe region in the case of the endogenous scenario. The main
macroeconomic eﬀects are enhanced for this region in 2050 as a consequence
of the higher number of migrants compared to the exogenous case. In partic-
ular, the positive impact on saving is now more important in Western Europe
than in the North American region.
Concerning the ﬁnancing of PAYG pension schemes, the endogenous migra-
tion scenario lowers the ﬁnancial needs even further compared to the UN06
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Table 4: Contribution rates evolution
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Western Europe Baseline 17.1% 19.1% 22.5% 27.6% 30.7% 31.9%
UN 06 17.1% 18.7% 21.5% 25.4% 27.1% 28.0%
Endo. Flows 17.1% 18.7% 21.3% 24.8% 25.7% 25.5%
North America Baseline 9.1% 10.4% 13.4% 16.5% 17.4% 17.9%
UN 06 9.1% 9.9% 12.1% 13.9% 13.7% 14.3%
Endo. Flows 9.1% 9.8% 12.0% 13.6% 13.1% 13.4%
Sources: Authors' calculations
scenario, particularly in the Western Europe region (Table 4). For instance,
in the European case, the contribution rate is 6.4 percentage points lower
in the endogenous ﬂows scenario in 2050 compared to the baseline without
migration (2.5 percentage points lower than the UN06 scenario). Given that
the contribution rate is likely to increase by 14.8 percentage points between
2000 and 2050 in Western Europe, introducing endogenous migration ﬂows
reduces by less than a half the ﬁnancial burden arising from ageing. Conse-
quently, even if it induces a sharp increase in migration ﬂows, this scenario
does not totally oﬀset the eﬀect of ageing and thus raises the question of
pension reforms in a near future.
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7 Conclusion
History teaches how the search of better living conditions and higher wages
is a strong motive for emigration. From an economic perspective, migration
ﬂows around the world are ﬁrst apprehended as a change in the geographic
structure of the global labor force. In the arrival countries, the increase of
the labor force, as long as most of the new comers work, entails an increase
in the capital return which attracts capital ﬂows. Of course, the reverse ef-
fect characterizes the leaving countries. As a consequence, migration ﬂows
change the geographic structure of the wages around the world. From this
perspective, using a world general equilibrium model as INGENUE 2 in eval-
uating the migration ﬂows for the next century has two main advantages.
First, it allows studying simultaneously the impact of the migration ﬂows on
the arrival countries as well as on the leaving countries. Second, it allows
evaluating the feedback eﬀect of capital ﬂows and wage changes on migration
ﬂows.
The introduction of endogenous migration ﬂows into INGENUE 2 brings
some lights on several important demographic and economic questions. First,
migration could have substantial impact on GDP growth in the regions re-
ceiving the migrants (positive impact) but also on the regions sending the
migrants (negative impact). According to our simulations, Western Europe
and North America should beneﬁt substantially from the arrival of cohorts of
migrants in the next decades. Second, despite their sizes, these ﬂows will not
be suﬃcient to counteract the impact of population ageing in these regions:
even when immigration ﬂows are taken into account, pension reforms in these
ageing regions (and in particular in Western Europe) will remain necessary.
In order to quantify this result, we can note that taking endogenous migra-
tion ﬂows into account leads to a decrease of 6.5 percentage points of the
contribution rate in Western Europe in 2050 (4.5 percentage points in North
America), compared to the baseline scenario without migrations.
With the interaction that we have modeled between the demographic part
and the economic part of the world OLG model, we have been able to project
dynamic migrations ﬂows. Note that this corresponds to one of the research
priorities deﬁned by the National-Research-Council (2000) in order to im-
prove the projections of international migration ﬂows. According to us, this
work constitutes a ﬁrst step in this direction and we consider that future
researches on projections of international migration ﬂows could build on the
methodology that we have developed. Our methodology has to be improved
by further researches. On the one hand, immigrants are assumed to have
exactly the same productivity as the native workers. The skill distribution
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of immigrants from developing regions suggests that they may be less skilled
than the average European and North American worker. On the other hand,
the remittances ﬂows (associated with the migrations ﬂows) are not mod-
eled in our framework. Clearly, these ﬂows could be of great importance,
from a quantitative point of view, noticeably when we focus on some speciﬁc
countries.
Furthermore, the general equilibrium multi-regions OLG model that we use
has several assumptions that could limit the scope of our analysis. Firstly,
the INGENUE 2 model assumes perfect ﬂexibility in the labor and goods
markets. Thus, immigration has no impact on unemployment and economic
output is continuously at potential. Secondly, the age of migrants is limited
to some speciﬁc cohort and we do not model return migration. Such demo-
graphic assumptions would be quite diﬃcult to include in our multi-regions
OLG framework. Despite the shortcomings that we mention, it appears that
the main value-added of our analysis is the long term general equilibrium
analysis of international migration ﬂows that we propose.
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Appendix 1: Regional grouping
The World is divided in 10 regions according mainly to geographical criteria
in the following way:
1. "Western Europe" : 'Channel Islands', 'Denmark', 'Finland', 'Ice-
land', 'Ireland', 'Norway', 'Sweden', 'United Kingdom', 'Greece', 'Italy',
'Malta', 'Portugal', 'Spain', 'Austria', 'Belgium', 'France', 'Germany'
(East + West), 'Luxembourg', 'Netherlands', 'Switzerland'.
2. "Eastern Europe" : 'Estonia', 'Latvia', Lithuania', 'Bulgaria', 'Czech
Republic', 'Hungary', 'Poland' 'Romania', 'Slovakia', 'Slovenia', 'Alba-
nia', 'Bosnia and Herzegovina', 'Croatia', 'Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia'.
3. "North America" : 'Canada', 'United States of America', 'Aus-
tralia', 'New Zealand', 'Melanesia', 'Fiji', 'New Caledonia', 'Papua New
Guinea', Solomon Islands', 'Vanuatu', 'Micronesia', 'Guam', 'Polyne-
sia', 'French Polynesia', 'Samoa'.
4. "Latin America" : 'Argentina', 'Bolivia', 'Brazil', 'Chile', 'Colom-
bia', 'Ecuador', 'French Guiana', 'Guyana', 'Paraguay', 'Peru', 'Suri-
name', 'Uruguay', 'Venezuela', 'Belize', 'Costa Rica', 'El Salvador',
'Guatemala', 'Honduras', 'Mexico', 'Nicaragua', 'Panama', 'Bahamas',
'Barbados', 'Cuba', 'Dominican Republic', 'Guadeloupe', 'Haiti', 'Ja-
maica', 'Martinique', 'Netherlands Antilles', 'Puerto Rico', 'Saint Lu-
cia', 'Trinidad and Tobago'.
5. Japan
6. "MediterraneanWorld" : 'Algeria', 'Egypt', 'Libyan Arab Jamahiriya',
'Morocco', , 'Tunisia', 'Western Sahara', 'Armenia', 'Azerbaijan', 'Bahrain',
'Cyprus', 'Georgia', 'Iraq', 'Iran', 'Israel', 'Jordan', 'Kuwait', 'Lebanon',
'Occupied Palestinian Territory', 'Oman', 'Qatar', 'Saudi Arabia', 'Syr-
ian Arab Republic', 'Turkey', 'United Arab Emirates', 'Yemen'. 'Turk-
menistan', 'Uzbekistan' 'Kyrgyzstan'
7. "Chinese World" : 'China', 'Democratic People's Republic of Ko-
rea', 'Mongolia', 'Republic of Korea', 'Brunei Darussalam', 'Cambo-
dia', 'East Timor', 'Lao People's Democratic Republic', 'Myanmar',
'Philippines', 'Singapore', 'Thailand', 'Viet Nam'.
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8. "Africa" : 'Burundi', 'Comoros', 'Djibouti', 'Eritrea', 'Ethiopia', 'Kenya',
'Madagascar', 'Malawi', 'Mauritius', 'Mozambique', 'Réunion', 'Rwanda',
'Somalia', 'Uganda', 'Tanzania', 'Zambia', 'Zimbabwe', 'Angola', 'Cameroon',
'Central African Republic', 'Chad', 'Congo', 'Democratic Republic of
the Congo', 'Equatorial Guinea', 'Gabon', 'Botswana', 'Lesotho', 'Namibia',
'South Africa', 'Swaziland', 'Benin', 'Burkina Faso', 'Cape Verde', 'Côte
d'Ivoire', 'Gambia', 'Ghana', 'Guinea', 'Guinea-Bissau', 'Liberia', 'Mali',
'Mauritania', 'Niger', 'Nigeria', 'Senegal', 'Sierra Leone', 'Togo'. 'Su-
dan'
9. "Russian World" : 'Belarus', 'Russian Federation', 'Ukraine', 'Re-
public of Moldova',
10. "Indian World" : 'India', 'Afghanistan', 'Bangladesh', 'Bhutan',
'Maldives', 'Nepal', 'Pakistan', 'Sri Lanka', 'Tajikistan', 'Indonesia',
'Kazakhstan', 'Malaysia'.
Appendix 2: Description of the model
In this appendix, we provide a technical presentation of the economic part
of the INGENUE 2 model. A complete presentation of the model could be
found in Ingenue (2007).
Households
Economic choices of households concern consumption/saving and are made
with perfect foresight at the beginning of their adult life. Labor supply is
assumed to be exogenously given by the age-speciﬁc rate of participation to
the labor market, noted : eza. We take International Labor Organization
(ILO) data and projections to characterize activity from 1950 until 2015 and
we assume that after this date participation rates remain ﬁxed at their 2015
level. Adults can (partially) retire from age rz and they may not stay in the
labor force after a legal maximal mandatory retirement age r¯z.
The intertemporal preferences of a new entrant in working life, native or
migrant, are given by the following life-time utility function over uncertain
streams of consumption cza and leaving a voluntary bequest H
z to their chil-
dren when they reach the age of T (if they survive until this age)17 :
17Usually in these kind of model the age T is the biological limit to life (here 105 years.)
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U za0(t) =
20∑
a=a0
ρa−a0
[
a−1∏
i=a0
szi (t+ i)
]
η
η − 1c
z
a(t+ a− a0)
η−1
η
+ ρT−a0
T∏
i=a0
szT (t+ T − a0)V (Hz(t+ T − a0)) (4)
where ρ is the psychological discount factor, Ca is consumption at age a ; η
is the intertemporal substitution rate and V (·) is the instantaneous utility
of bequest : each agent has some felicity from leaving a bequest but it is
independent of the future stream of the consumption that his children draw
from this bequest (warm glow altruism).
At any given period, the budget constraint is :
τ za (t)p
z
f (t)C
z
a(t) + p
z
f (t)S
z
a(t) = Y
z
a (t) + p
z
f (t)S
z
a−1(t− 1)
Rz(t)
sa−1(t− 1)
+ pzf (t)h
z
a(t)− pzf (t)Hz(t)ΥT (t) (5)
Y za (t) =

ζza(t) + (1− θz(t))wz(t)ea(t)ϑa for a < ra
(1− θz(t))wz(t)ea(t)ϑa + (1− ea(t))P za (t) for ra ≤ a < r¯a
P za (t) for a ≥ r¯a
where Sza denotes the stock of assets held by the individual at the end of
age a and time t, Rz(t) · Sa(−1) is ﬁnancial income (domestic real returns
on assets holdings times wealth). We assume Sa0−1 = 0 and S20 ≥ 0 for all
a ∈ [a0, . . . , 20]. τa is the age-speciﬁc equivalence scale that takes into account
costs of child-rearing (see details hereafter), and Ya is the non assets-based
net disposal income. τ za (t)p
z
f (t)C
z
a(t) denotes the total consumption (that is
the consumption of the parents and the one of their children). pzf (t)S
z
a(t)
represents the wealth at the end of date t. pzf (t) denotes the price of the
domestic ﬁnal good (in terms of one foreign goods) so Rz(t) is one plus the
return to capital income expressed in units of this ﬁnal good. Due to life
uncertainty at the individual level, we assume following Yaari (1965) that
there exists perfect annuities markets that pool death risk within the same
generation so that the return to capital is "corrected" by the instantaneous
but in order to imply a realistic pattern of inheritance among the children of deceased
households, we assume that T is equal to 80 years old.
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survival probability of the generation. Besides children receive inherited as-
sets hza(t− 1) from the voluntary bequests of their parents. People will leave
bequest Hz(t) to their heirs only at the age of T, so in Equation (5) ΥT (t)
is a dummy that will be equal to 1 if a = T and zero in any other case.
For full-time active years (a ∈ [a0, ra[), Ya is simply equal to the net labor
income after social security taxes (at rate θ), where w is the real wage rate per
eﬃcient unit of labor at time t. When the agent is partly retired (a ∈ [ra, r¯a[),
she also receives a pension beneﬁt P za for the unworked hours. And when she
is full-time retired (a ∈ [r¯a, 20]) she only receives the pension beneﬁt. Unless
special mention, pension beneﬁts are assumed to be age independent.
The τ za term is the age-speciﬁc equivalence scale. It takes into account the
direct and indirect private costs of child-rearing. In order to calculate this
relative cost of child-rearing for each cohort, we use the age distribution of
children for each parent (from their past fertility behavior) and a constant
age equivalence scale of children.18. ζza(t) is the labor income that children
bring to their parents resources during their childhood (calculated in the
same spirit as costs of children-rearing).
An agent's earning ability is assumed to be an exogenous function of his
age. These skill diﬀerences by age are captured by the eﬃciency parameter
ϑa which changes with age in a hump-shape way to reﬂect the evolution of
human capital. For simplicity, we assume that this age-eﬃciency proﬁle is
time-invariant and is the same in all regions. We adopt Miles (1999) human
capital proﬁle's estimation and ϑa is normalized so that ϑa0 = 1.
Voluntary bequests are distributed to children according to the fertility cal-
endar of their deceased parents. At the equilibrium the sum of voluntary
bequest will be equal to the inheritance received by children. We assume
that bequests are distributed equally to all children, i.e. proportional to the
proportion of the children born from cohort of age T (according to her past
fertility calendar).
In our international context, households can choose the region they want
to invest their wealth. The tradeoﬀ between domestic and foreign assets is
characterized by :
Rz(t) = R?(t)
pzf (t− 1)
pzf (t)
for all t > 0 (6)
18Trying to get a more detailed structure would entail keeping the distribution of children
with respects to their grand-parents and would complicate in an useless way the number
of state variables in the system.
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whereR?(t) is the unique world interest factor (in terms of the world numéraire),
the condition (6) means that if a region z'household saves one unit in his do-
mestic asset (capital) it will yield Rz(t) in real terms the next period, if he
chooses to invest in foreign assets he will receive in real terms R?(t)
pzf (t−1)
pzf (t)
.
The arbitrage condition then leads to return equalization.
The public sector
The pension P za (t) paid is a fraction κ(t) of the current average (net of tax)
wage [1− θz(t)]wz(t). We assume a time-to-time balanced-budget rule :
θz(t)
1− θz(t) = κ(t) ·
∑
a≥ra(1− ea(t))La(t)∑
a≤r¯a ea(t)La(t)
(7)
In the baseline case, the regional age ra of minimum legal retirement age as
well as the maximum age r¯a and the ratio κ(t) are ﬁxed (at least after year
2000). Payroll tax rates θ(t) are thus endogenously determined by (7).
Production side
Intermediate good sector
Each zone z specializes in the production Y Iz of a single intermediate good.
Production in period t takes place with a constant return to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function using capital stock Kz(t − 1) installed at the
beginning of the period t in the country z and the full domestic labor force
N z(t), ∀z :
Y Iz(t) = AIz(t) (Kz(t− 1))α (N z(t))1−α 0 < α < 1 (8)
The maximization of the ﬁrm value will imply that at the equilibrium (∀t) :
R?(t+ 1)
pzf (t)
pzf (t+ 1)
+ δz(t+ 1)− 1 = p
z
I(t+ 1)
pzf (t+ 1)
αAIz(t+ 1) (kz(t))α−1(9)
wz(t) = pzI(t)(1− α)AIz(t) (kz(t− 1))α(10)
where pzI is the price of the domestic intermediate good, δ
z(t) is the rate of
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economic depreciation and kz(t − 1) = Kz(t − 1)/N z(t) is the capital-labor
ratio.
Final good production sector
The domestic composite ﬁnal good of region z, Y F z, is produced according
to a combination of two intermediate goods: a "domestic" intermediate good
in quantities Bz and a "World" intermediate good in quantities M z, accord-
ing to the following CES technology, where σ ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of
substitution, ∀z :
Y F z(t) = AF z(t)
[
(ωz)
1
σz (Bz(t))
σz−1
σz + (1− ωz) 1σz (M z(t))σ
z−1
σz
] σz
σz−1
(11)
with ωz ∈ [0, 1]. This CES combination of external and internal good to
produce domestic ﬁnal good is a reminiscence of Armington (1969) aggre-
gator, AF z(t) being total factor productivity. Taking prices as given, the
competitive behavior producer determines Bz and M z that minimizes cur-
rent proﬁt: pzf (t)Y F
z(t) − pzI(t)Bz(t) − p?(t) ·M z(t) subject to (11), where
pzI is the price of the home-speciﬁc intermediate good and p
? is the price of
the world intermediate good.
The world producer of an homogenous world intermediate good
In order to simplify the exchanges of intermediate goods between regions of
the world, we assume that there exists a ﬁctive world producer that uses all
region-speciﬁc intermediate goods in quantities X?,z in order to produce a
speciﬁc world intermediate good Y ? according to the following CES function :
Y ?(t) = A?(t)
[∑
z
γz(t)
1
µXz(t)
µ−1
µ
] µ
µ−1
(12)
This ﬁctive producer is assumed to act competitively, taking prices as given.
Hence, he chooses {Xz(t)}z, at each period, to maximize its static proﬁt :
p?(t)Y ?(t)−∑z pzI(t) ·Xz(t), subject to (12). This yields at the equilibrium
the following factor demand function :
Xz(t) = γz(t) (Ez(t))−µ Y ?(t)A?(t)µ−1 for all z (13)
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where for convenience Ez(t) =
pzI (t)
p?(t)
is deﬁned as the terms of trade. It can
be shown that at the equilibrium p? equals to :
p? =
[
∑
z γzp
z
I(t)
1−µ]
1
1−µ
A?(t)
A "trick" to model real imperfections on world ﬁnancial market
For a world macroeconomic model to be realistic, the world asset capital
market has to be imperfect. Because sources of imperfection and asymmetries
in ﬁnancial markets are various and uneasy to model with rigorous micro-
foundations in such a large scale model as Ingenue, we adopt the following
ad hoc formulation for δz the region-speciﬁc rate of economic depreciation,
with ε > 0 :
δz(t) = δ¯z + (1− δ¯z)∆z ·Max
(
1− S
z(t− 1)
Kz(t− 1); 0
)ε
for all z (14)
where Sz(t) =
∑19
a=a0
La(t)Sa(t) is the aggregate ﬁnancial wealth across all
cohorts in region z which is equal to the sum of the region capital stock and
the net assets on the rest of the world. This equation then indicates that
capital invested in a region z depreciates more rapidly than the average when
the region is a net debtor to the rest of the world.
Appendix 3: Interpolation procedure for annual
foreign migrants stock
In order to obtain annual estimates of the stock of foreign migrants we adapt
the interpolation procedure of Clark et al. (2007) to our purposes. More
speciﬁcally, we interpolate between the 1990 and 2000 benchmarks obtained
from Docquier & Marfouk (2005) using the following stock adjustment equa-
tion:
Sdot+1 = Mdot + ddoSdot (15)
where St is the stock at the beginning of year t and Mt is the ﬂow during
that year. We use the gross ﬂows from the IMSC database to update the
stock.
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The parameter d reﬂects deaths, return migration, and illegal immigration,
which subtract or add to the stock independently of the additions through
gross immigration and hence 1−d is the rate at which the stock depreciates.
This depreciation rate is calculated for the interval between 1990 and 2000
using an iterative procedure beginning with St, such that the value of St+10
obtained by cumulating forward is reconciled with that of the next Census
benchmark. Thus there is a diﬀerent value of d for each destination-origin
country pair. We then use this value of d and the gross migration ﬂows from
the IMSC database to extrapolate forward to 2004 and backward to 1985.
Even if this methodology is somewhat questionable, it appears to reasonably
reproduce the migration stocks evolution in destination countries. Indeed,
our results have been gauged with success for the 6 main OECD receiving
countries (United States, Canada, Australia, United-Kingdom, France and
Germany) with the database of Defoort (2008).
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